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“Ideals without technique are a mess. But technique without ideals is a 
menace.”1 
  —Karl Llewellyn 
It has been repeatedly concluded over many decades that legal education fails 
to adequately train students for the practice of law.2 The educational critique 
gained vigor in 2007 when the Carnegie Foundation published its study of the 
professional training of lawyers, concluding that legal education focused too 
heavily on teaching the cognitive analysis of legal doctrine and not enough on 
teaching practical skills and professional values.3 On the heels of the economic 
downturn, a new line of criticism of legal education has emerged, which takes 
law schools to task for imposing the soaring costs of legal education on law 
students graduating into a contracting market for legal services.4 With declining 
student enrollments and greater competition among law schools for applicants, 
the mandate to lower costs is no longer just a moral imperative for many law 
schools—reductions in tuition revenue make cost-cutting an inescapable reality.5 
These critiques of legal education push law schools toward two seemingly 
contradictory goals: (1) provide more practical training to a greater number of 
students and (2) lower operational costs. This Article is for those who have a 
sincere desire to do both. It is based on the premise that the educational critique 
repeated over decades is correct: legal education needs to deliver better education 
across a broader spectrum of essential lawyering skills and values. However, it 
accepts the economic reality that law schools cannot achieve this goal by simply 
grafting additional low-enrollment experiential courses onto the existing law 
school curriculum and hoping that students will select them in a largely 
unstructured upper-level curriculum. Instead, the basic program of legal 
education needs to be restructured to move students in an orderly way through 
the acquisition of basic legal knowledge, essential lawyering skills, and 
underlying professional values. 
 
1. Karl Llewellyn, On What’s Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 662 
(1935). 
2. For a comprehensive review of the history of such critiques of legal education going back to the end of 
the nineteenth century, see A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1949, 1982–2015 (2012). 
3. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW 74–
84 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]. The same year, the Clinical Legal Education Association released a 
volume describing the best practices for planning and implementing a well-rounded program of legal education. 
ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES REPORT]. 
4. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, THE CRISIS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 18–19 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 
2011) (discussing the high costs imposed as a result of accreditation); Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five 
Theses: Systemic Reforms of American Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S. C. L. REV. 55, 59–60 (2012); 
Spencer, supra note 2, at 1951–56. 
5. Todd Petys, The Analytic Classroom, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1255, 1256–58 (2012). 
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Although this Article will offer concrete suggestions for both a substantially 
restructured program of legal education and a menu of suggestions for more 
immediate and low-cost options, it will first address the mental and psychological 
barriers to reform—the mistakes in thinking—that keep law faculties from 
implementing change. At the deepest level of these mental barriers is a basic 
myth: professional education can meaningfully separate theory from practice.6 
This myth divides law school education into a series of dichotomies. It views the 
traditional case method of instruction in legal education as teaching “doctrine” 
and lumps together all other kinds of instruction—legal writing, simulations, 
clinics, and externships—as teaching “skills.” It aligns the teaching of doctrine 
with theory and the teaching of skills with practice.7 It divides responsibility for 
the law school curriculum, significantly outsourcing lawyering skills instruction 
to adjunct professors or assigning it to faculty members in job statuses that give 
them less power and authority in faculty governance.8 The imbalance in faculty 
governance perpetuates the imbalance in instruction by keeping curricular 
decision-making in the hands of traditional classroom teachers. 
Part I of this Article challenges the dichotomy between theory and practice. It 
demonstrates that what is traditionally thought of as “doctrinal” instruction 
regularly sacrifices breadth of doctrinal knowledge in favor of a particular kind 
of skills training: the ability to analyze appellate cases, to extract and synthesize 
their underlying principles, and to apply these principles to new situations.9 
However, instruction based on traditional casebooks also has structural 
limitations as skills training: (1) it provides students with a closed and artificial 
universe of legal authority that neither captures the breadth of substantive law 
they will need as practitioners nor gives them practice in finding the law they will 
need to know; (2) it fails to contextualize legal analysis and reasoning within the 
larger framework of the lawyering process, which includes problem-solving and 
advocating for clients based on their unique circumstances and operating in the 
context of unstructured facts; and (3) it overlooks the forward-looking analysis 
associated with transactional lawyering. Once the traditional case method 
instruction is revealed as a kind of skills training, the foregone opportunities to 
create more balanced coverage of skills instruction in law school become clear.10 
Part II of this Article examines the characteristics of integration, 
collaboration, and progression that represent a well-balanced law school 
curriculum. Like well-executed Socratic classroom instruction, other lawyering 
skills, such as client interviewing, client counseling, fact development, 
 
6. See generally Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 
34 UCLA L. REV. 577 (1987). 
7. Id. at 578. 
8. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2022–23. 
9. See infra Part I.A. 
10. Spiegel, supra note 6, at 578. 
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negotiation, and persuasion, have underlying analytic frameworks that explain 
processes of behavior that seem intuitive to experts who have internalized them. 
By making these underlying frameworks explicit, instructors in other skills 
courses can use them to step students through the lawyering processes of 
analyzing facts, understanding their clients’ interests and positions, and artfully 
persuading others.11 The breakdown between theory and practice erodes the 
justification for an “outsourcing” model of legal education, in which law school 
faculty primarily concern themselves with teaching the theory and analysis of 
appellate cases, and view “other skills” as belonging outside the realm of the 
legal academy.12 Additionally, it helps define a greater faculty role in skills 
instruction, and suggests a different division of responsibility and opportunities 
for collaboration between the legal academy and the practicing bar in developing 
a well-rounded program of professional instruction.13 
Part III addresses two major barriers to reform in legal education: (1) the 
specter of bar examination, which motivates student demand for bar instruction 
and drives faculties to offer case method instruction in core bar courses; and (2) 
concerns about the costs of experiential education, which make it difficult to 
balance instruction in legal education by simply adding more experiential 
courses.14 Part III proposes both structural changes to the legal education and a 
menu of alternative strategies for delivering skills instruction by redeploying 
existing resources within law schools and realigning the partnerships between the 
legal academy and the practicing bar.15 
I. THE CASEBOOK METHOD OF INSTRUCTION 
This Part explores both the benefits and the shortcomings of the casebook 
method of instruction. The appellate case method in legal education was 
originally designed as an interactive instructional method for uncovering and 
synthesizing the organizing principles that underlie substantive doctrinal law.16 
However, its lasting value has been secured by a different feature: its facility in 
instilling the habits of mind that characterize a distinctively lawyer-like mode of 
analysis and reasoning. In short, the case dialogue method of instruction is 
valuable as a form of professional skills training. 
Yet, viewed as skills training, the case method of instruction can take 
students only a limited distance toward becoming competent, entry-level 
professionals because its structure limits the ability to develop a broad range of 
 
11. See infra Part II.A.  
12. See infra Part II.B. 
13. See infra Part II.C–D.  
14. See infra Part III.A.  
15. See infra Part III.B.  
16. See Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. 
REV. 577, 581 (1987). 
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lawyering skills.17 Moreover, its inefficiency limits its usefulness in teaching 
either the breadth of substantive doctrinal law a practicing lawyer needs to know, 
or the research skills lawyers use to find the law that is relevant in their practice. 
A.  What the Appellate Case Method Accomplishes 
As originally conceived by Christopher Columbus Langdell, the appellate 
case method was a method of teaching the substantive law that practicing lawyers 
needed to know.18 At the heart of Langdell’s pedagogy was a formalist 
conception of law as a system of finite, neutral, and consistent principles, which 
could be extracted from the study of appellate cases and used to logically derive 
correct results in future cases.19 Langdell sometimes analogized the study of law 
to the study of natural science.20 In this view, appellate cases are like specimens 
that can be examined to reveal fundamental legal doctrines, which could then be 
“so classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper place, and 
nowhere else. . . .”21 It followed from this view of the law that the “proper 
workshop” for aspiring lawyers was the law library, which Langdell described as 
being to the law school what “the laboratories of the university are to the 
chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history to the zoologists, [and] 
the botanical garden to the botanists.”22 Langdell’s belief in the possibility of 
distilling from appellate cases a complete set of principled doctrines, the mastery 
of which permitted lawyers to “apply them with constant facility and certainty to 
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs,”23 justified the appellate casebook 
method as the study of substantive doctrinal law.24 
The formalist jurisprudence that justified the Langdellian case method 
quickly buckled under critique, captured most aptly by Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
aphorism that “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”25 
Following Holmes, thinkers aligned with American Legal Realism insisted that 
judges decide cases, not on the basis of logical deduction, but based on the 
 
17. See infra Part I.B. 
18. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 53 
(1983). 
19. Id. at 53–54; Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 11 (1983). 
20. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 11–13 (1973). 
21. Grey, supra note 19, at 13 (quoting CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1879)). 
22. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 123, 124 
(1887). 
23. Grey, supra note 19, at 13 (quoting CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1879)). 
24. Id. at 11–12. 
25. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897). 
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judges’ senses of the factual situations and their ideas about good public policy.26 
According to this critique, legal rules and principles do not dictate and may not 
even determine judicial decisions; rather, judges use legal reasoning to justify the 
results they intuitively or pragmatically want to reach.27 Realist critics shared 
Langdell’s premise that the most central task for lawyers was prediction of how 
judges would decide cases.28 However, realists insisted that to learn this skill one 
must study, not the reasoning used to justify decisions, but the behavior of judges 
and the patterns of judicial decision making.29 
Despite the effective dismantling of legal doctrine’s pretentions to systemic 
completeness and logical determinacy, the appellate case method of instruction 
continues to thrive.30 Why, one might wonder, would such a thoroughly 
discredited jurisprudence continue to drive what the Carnegie Foundation 
characterized as the “signature pedagogy” of legal education?31 The answer is 
that the case method thrives, not because it teaches legal doctrine especially 
effectively, but because it imparts an essential set of foundational lawyering 
skills.32 
The importance of the case analysis and legal argumentation skills can be 
explained jurisprudentially as well. As future participants in the legal system, law 
students need to learn to incorporate what H.L.A. Hart called an “internal point 
of view” of the law, which views rules of law as the source of reasons for action33 
even as they acknowledge that the development of law may be influenced by 
external factors.34 By studying the law from an external perspective, as the Legal 
Realists did, you can understand, for example, that federal judges appointed by a 
Democratic president are statistically more likely to rule in favor of civil rights 
plaintiffs, and that this tendency is amplified if they sit on a panel with other 
 
26. Brian Lieter calls this the “Core Claim” of Legal Realism. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: 
Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 275–76 (1997). 
27. Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Legal Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
1222, 1236–42 (1931); Joseph C. Hucheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in 
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1928). 
28. See e.g., HOLMES, The Path of Law, supra note 25, at 457. 
29. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND x–xi (1930). 
30. Gary Shaw, A Heretical View of Teaching: A Contrarian Looks at Teaching, the Carnegie Report, 
and Best Practices, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1239, 1259–62 (2012). 
31. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 23–24. 
32. Shaw, supra note 30. 
33. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 134–47 (1961). 
34. Legal Realism shares an external, behavioral perspective on law with its more recent academic 
progeny, the Law and Economics, Critical Legal Studies, and Law and Society movements, all of which view 
the influence of external forces studied in the social sciences on law. Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential 
Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 632–38 (1989) (discussing Critical Legal Studies, Law, and 
Economics and feminist legal theory); Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 335, 335–40 (1988) (discussing Critical Legal Studies and Law and Economics as responses 
to Legal Realism); see generally Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t 
What They Used to Be” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365 (discussing the roots of the Law and Society movement in Legal 
Realism). 
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judges appointed by Democratic presidents.35 But, you cannot argue to a federal 
judge that her appointment by a Democratic president is a reason for her to rule 
in favor of your client. Although lawyers’ advocacy may be informed by 
understanding the external economic and political dynamics of law’s 
development and implementation, at the end of the day, legal arguments are 
crafted in terms of the authority of legal rules and consistency with underlying 
principles.36 
The appellate case method has pedagogical benefits that go beyond 
developing law students’ capacity to read cases and formulate legal arguments, 
the most celebrated of which is its facility in teaching law students the deep 
structure of “thinking like lawyers.”37 As the recent Carnegie study of 
professional legal education noted, the repeated parsing of appellate cases in 
first-year law school classes teaches students to think in a distinctly legal way 
about the material at hand, honing in on legally relevant facts with “both 
precision and generality.”38 The professor-student dialogue that characterizes the 
case method continually shifts the facts or points of view from which students 
view the facts, demonstrating how different facts would strengthen or weaken 
different legal arguments.39 The resultant ability to sort and categorize facts 
according to generalized elements of legal doctrine—to “spot legal issues”—is 
part of the deep structure of legal professionalism, defined by the American Bar 
Association as the “most fundamental legal skill” comprising competence to 
practice law.40 
The lasting value in the case dialogue method thus lies in its facility as a 
particular kind of skills instruction; along with teaching foundational legal 
doctrine, it effectively hones the skills of legal analysis and argument and 
develops characteristically lawyer-like habits of thinking.41 However, once these 
skills are imparted, its value diminishes, as does students’ engagement in the 
learning process, which falls off dramatically during the second and third years 
of repetitive case method instruction.42 The next Section turns to the legal 
 
35. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 838–39 
(2008) (summarizing the work of “New Legal Realists” on demographic factors influencing judicial decision 
making). 
36. See Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 599  
(2007) (explaining the verisimilitude of the case method in relation to practice as a reason why it has survived 
the Realist critique of “law as science”). 
37. This shift in emphasis came early in the twentieth century. Spiegel, supra note 6, at 582–83. 
38. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 54–55. 
39. Id. at 64–66. 
40. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1, cmt. 2 (“Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill 
consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends 
any particular specialized knowledge.”). 
41. Petys, supra note 5, at 1284–91 (citing longitudinal empirical studies concluding that law students’ 
legal analysis improves over the second or third year of law school). 
42. Id. at 1270-71; Spencer, supra note 2, at 2034-35. But see Shaw, supra  note 30, at 1291–93 (arguing 
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knowledge, lawyering skills, and analytic frameworks that the case dialogue 
method misses—subjects that should form the basis for the law school 
curriculum beyond the first year of law school. 
B.  What Case Method Instruction Misses 
As effective as the case dialogue method is in teaching the deep structure of 
“thinking like a lawyer,” the repetitive focus on analysis of appellate cases 
through three years of law school leaves much to be desired. As a method of 
teaching substantive law, it is both inefficient and incomplete: the absence of 
actual clients and factual context under-develops client problem-solving and 
advocacy skills, and the litigation context of disputes in appellate cases fails to 
capture the analytic frameworks for using the law in transactional contexts. 
1.  Inadequacy in Teaching Substantive Law 
Perhaps the most surprising shortcoming of the case dialogue is its 
inadequacy in covering the basic substantive law that practicing lawyers need to 
know.43 Although this criticism may seem novel in an age when the focus of 
criticism of the case method is its failure to teach a breadth of lawyering skills, 
the criticism is not new. The 1928 Reed Report noted that, in comparison to the 
lecture method, the case dialogue method “is so onerous, demanding as it does 
perhaps twice as much time . . . that it increases the probability that the student 
will have to omit branches of law, acquaintance with which would be of value to 
him in his future practice.”44 In the mid-1940s, Karl Llewellyn similarly decried 
the case method’s futile attempt at broad subject-matter coverage, arguing that 
“man could hardly devise a more wasteful method” of imparting knowledge 
about the law.”45 And, as some have noted, the reality of classroom teaching 
today reflects a significant trend toward ramping up subject-matter coverage in 
upper-level courses.46 
However, attempting meaningful subject-matter coverage with traditional 
casebook materials is fraught with inherent problems that cannot be solved by 
moving more quickly through the material provided in a casebook. One of the 
problems is the sheer volume of material that practicing lawyers need to know, 
which cannot effectively be collected in a single edited volume. However, there 
 
for a continuing but diminished role of Socratic method in the second and third years). 
43. Id. at 1267–69. 
44. ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 223 (1921). 
45. Karl L. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 215 (1948). 
Llewellyn’s views shaped the 1944 report of the Committee on Curriculum of the Association of American Law 
Schools, published as The Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 345 (1945) [hereinafter 
LLEWELLYN REPORT]. 
46. Petys, supra note 5, at 1272–73. 
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are also deeper structural problems with the casebook format. For example, by 
providing students with carefully excerpted cases gathered together in a single 
volume, the case method actively discourages students from developing the 
research skills necessary to find relevant law for themselves.47 The focus on 
extracting legal principles from cases also gives short shrift to developing the 
analytical skills needed to read and understand the law in fields dominated by 
statutes and administrative regulations. The need to create casebooks for a 
national market distorts instruction in areas dominated by state and local law by 
collecting exemplary cases from diverse jurisdictions rather than teaching the 
interplay between statutory, administrative, and case law in a single jurisdiction. 
The instruction in a typical Criminal Law class illustrates some of these 
shortcomings. The heart of legal research and analysis in criminal practice begins 
with state and local statutes, yet Criminal Law casebooks largely ignore in-depth 
coverage of any particular jurisdiction in favor of collections of appellate cases 
drawn from diverse jurisdictions. To help teach the importance of statutory 
analysis, Criminal Law textbooks sometimes utilize the Model Penal Code. 
However, unlike uniform laws or model rules in other areas, the influence of the 
Model Penal Code is largely historical;48 state criminal codes have never closely 
tracked the language in the Model Penal Code even in areas like the definition of 
mens rea, where the Model Penal Code has been especially influential.49 
Moreover, the basic outline of doctrinal coverage in Criminal Law is imbalanced 
when compared to the substantive law that lawyers in practice need to know. 
Students may spend an entire Criminal Law class discussing the idiosyncratic 
question of whether a defendant can be held criminally responsible for actions 
taken while sleepwalking, but never touch on common issues that routinely arise 
in criminal law practice, such as whether a defendant legally possesses illegal 
drugs found underneath the passenger’s seat of the car he is driving. 
Law schools typically offer Criminal Law as a first-year course, and its 
lapses in substantive coverage can be forgiven in light of the indirect benefit 
students derive from using Criminal Law casebook materials as fodder for 
learning how to think like lawyers. Gathering a sampling of cases together in one 
volume makes sense when the primary purpose is to teach students how to read 
and analyze appellate cases. Studying the Model Penal Code can provide 
additional practice in the transferable analytical skill of deriving elements from 
statutory language. And the focus on exotic examples, like sleepwalking 
 
47. See id. 
48. Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 947–
53 (1999) (describing the main influences of the Model Penal Code as stimulating jurisdictions to codify their 
criminal law, re-orienting scholarship from common law to legislative perspectives on criminal law, and 
clarifying the principles of mens rea). 
49. See generally Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on 
State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. 
L. REV. 229 (1997) (surveying adoption of the mens rea requirements in twenty-two states). 
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defendants, helps illustrate basic underlying principles, such as the requirement 
that criminal liability requires a voluntary act. However, once students master the 
skills associated with legal analysis and reasoning and move on to upper-level 
courses, the time-consuming process of extracting law and slowly identifying 
underlying principles through the give-and-take of appellate case dialogue 
becomes increasingly difficult to defend.50 
2.  The Missing Context of the Lawyering Process: Clients and Facts 
In 1969, Chief Justice Warren Burger said that “[t]he shortcomings of 
today’s law graduate lies not in a decent knowledge of the law but that he has 
little, if any, training in dealing with facts or people—the stuff of which cases are 
really made.”51 Although the skills of legal analysis, reasoning, and argument are 
unquestionably important, they are embedded within a much broader lawyering 
process, which extends from the moment a client walks through the door for an 
initial consultation through the resolution of the client’s case.52 The lawyering 
process requires a range of essential skills beyond legal analysis and reasoning, 
including client interviewing and counseling, persuasive factual analysis, 
negotiation, and advocacy.53 The appellate case method suffers significant 
structural deficiencies as a platform for teaching these other lawyering skills 
because the study of appellate cases lacks two important elements: (1) experience 
with the way legal issues arise in the context of the clients’ non-legal interests 
and objectives, and (2) experience with indeterminate factual situations that 
require investigation and development of facts. 
a.  Client Problem-Solving 
As the Carnegie Report points out, one of the most glaring elements missing 
from the case dialogue method is experience with clients.54 Ann Shalleck has 
elaborated on this point, arguing that in typical law school classrooms, clients 
appear as “cardboard figures”55 removed from the social contexts that gave rise to 
their cases and severed from the web of relationships within which their disputes 
 
50. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2034–35 (discussing the declining benefit of case method in upper years). 
51. William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law Professor: A View 
 from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 469–70 (1995) (quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger, Address 
Before the ABA Convention Prayer Breakfast (Aug. 10, 1969)). 
52. The particular description of the lawyering process contemplates a dispute resolution context. The 
casebook method also has deficiencies with respect to representation of clients in the transactional planning 
context, which will be considered infra Part I.B.3. 
53. STEFAN H. KRIEGER, ET AL., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, 
NEGOTIATION AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 3–4 (4th ed. 2011). 
54. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 57. 
55. Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1735 
(1993). 
01_KRUSE_VER_01_6-18-13_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2014 9:52 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 45 
17 
arose.56 Clients appear in the case dialogue—if at all—as nominal placeholders 
for legal arguments: “If you represented the plaintiff [in this case], what would 
you argue in support of this rule?” 57 Such questions ask students to imagine how 
they would serve the interests of hypothetical clients who presumably want to 
win, as winning is conventionally defined, without any thought as to how the 
clients’ actual motivations, commitments, relationships, or the costs of litigation, 
might affect the decisions of real-life clients.58 
If left uncorrected, this oversimplification of clients’ objectives can lead to 
deeper problems of legal professionalism. In 1975, philosopher and early legal 
ethicist Richard Wasserstrom noted that professionals have a tendency to view a 
client or a patient “not as a whole person but as a segment or aspect of a 
person—an interesting kidney problem, a routine marijuana possession case, or 
another adolescent with an identity crisis.”59 This “legal objectification” of clients 
can result in problematic lawyer-client relationships, in which lawyers represent, 
not the actual clients before them, but standardized clients that the lawyers have 
constructed out of the legal interests the lawyers have imputed to them.60 
Wasserstrom’s concern that lawyers’ professionalized view of clients might 
create a mismatch between what clients actually want and what lawyers pursue 
for them bears out in empirical studies of the legal profession.61 Sometimes, the 
mismatch is a result of the law’s failure to provide a remedy for a client’s 
grievance, such as when divorce clients want to assign blame for the break-up of 
marriage in no-fault divorce systems that do not require parties to establish blame 
as a condition of getting a divorce.62 In other instances, lawyers overestimate the 
importance of financial outcomes to clients when compared with other non-
monetary objectives, such as the importance to medical malpractice plaintiffs of 
acceptance of responsibility, prevention of reoccurrence, answers, and apology.63 
In either case, lawyers’ professionalized view of their clients’ problems is shaped 
by the lens of legal issue-spotting that they bring to a client’s situation, which 
 
56. Id. at 1733. 
57. Id. at 1735. 
58. Id. at 1736. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.2, cmt. [2] (“[L]awyers usually defer 
to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be 
adversely affected.”). 
59. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 21 (1975). 
60. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 55 (1978); Warren Lehman, The 
Pursuit of A Client’s Interests 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078, 1087–88 (1979). 
61. See e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: 
POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 142–53 (1995) (studying client interactions with divorce 
lawyers); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation 
Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701 (2007) (surveying medical malpractice lawyers and clients); Lynn Mather, What 
Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1065, 1071–81 (2003) (surveying empirical research 
on lawyer-client relationships of criminal defense, divorce, personal injury, property and civil rights, and 
corporate lawyers). 
62. SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 61, at 37. 
63. Relis, supra note 61, at 346. 
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may not accurately capture the non-legal issues that predominate the clients’ 
view of the problem or situation.64 
By staying within the realm of hypothetical clients and their imagined 
objectives, the casebook method of legal instruction does little to prepare law 
students to ascertain a client’s multidimensional and sometimes shifting 
objectives.  Nor does the method prepare them to advocate for and advise clients 
whose legal issues are intertwined with an array of non-legal concerns.65 
b.  Facts, Factual Investigation, and Persuasive Storytelling 
Another major area of activity and concern for practicing lawyers is the 
analysis and development of facts.66 The statements of facts in appellate opinions 
consist of only a few facts drawn from the record of a lower court, selected and 
presented to lend rhetorical support to the legal conclusion that the author of the 
appellate opinion has drawn.67 Traditional law school examinations mirror this 
process: students are provided with a short statement of fixed and predetermined 
facts and evaluated on how well they spot and analyze the legal issues raised by 
those facts. 
In the practice of law, by contrast, lawyers must develop facts through 
investigation and discovery. Lawyers often begin with a preliminary legal theory 
that puts the client’s version of facts into existing structures of legal claims and 
defenses.68 But this preliminary analysis is only the beginning of the process. 
Lawyers must go on to analyze the factual propositions that might establish such 
legal claims or defenses; the documents or witnesses that might exist to 
substantiate, contradict, bolster or undermine those factual propositions; and the 
tools of investigation and discovery that the lawyer might use to pursue such 
potential evidence.69 The process of factual analysis proceeds in the opposite 
direction from the process of issue-spotting that professors test repeatedly in 
traditional law school examinations. Rather than beginning with a set of fixed 
facts and applying the law to them, factual investigation uses the law as a fixed 
framework and analyzes how the facts might be developed to meet or frustrate 
the establishment of legal claims and defenses. 
 
64. DAVID A. BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 2–15 (2d ed. 
1991). 
65. Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 132–
34 (2010). 
66. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2037–38. 
67. John Luebsdorf, The Structure of Legal Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447 (2001) (describing the 
rhetorical choices made in appellate opinions when viewed as stories); Ron Moss, Rhetorical Strategems in 
Judicial Opinions, 2 SCRIBE 103, 105–07 (1991). 
68. See generally Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of 
Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992) (discussing the interaction between 
client narratives and universalized legal narratives that constitute legal claims). 
69. KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 53, at 149–57. 
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Along the way, lawyers are likely to confront the factual ambiguity and 
conflict caused by imperfect recollection, omission, and conscious or 
unconscious shaping of reality to align with self-interest.70 Rather than passively 
accepting “the facts” presented to them, lawyers must examine witnesses’ 
possible motives, read between the lines of documents, and test different versions 
of the facts for their consistency with other facts, their plausibility compared to 
how people would be expected to behave, and how well they account for contrary 
facts that undermine them.71 As Jerome Frank once wrote, at the trial court level, 
judicial fact-finding is, in the end, a judge’s “subjective, fallible reaction to the 
subjective, fallible reactions of the witnesses to the actual, objective facts.”72 In 
developing cases, lawyers must learn how to maneuver within the realm of 
deeply subjective and shifting factual uncertainty. 
Factual analysis involves more than just analyzing how facts fit within the 
frameworks formed by the legal elements of claims and defenses. To be effective 
advocates, lawyers also need to know how to weave facts and inferences into 
persuasive stories.73 As Justice Souter aptly noted in Old Chief v. United States, 
“a syllogism is not a story.”74 When evidence is presented in narrative form, it has 
persuasive force “with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the 
willingness of jurors to draw the inferences . . . necessary to reach an honest 
verdict.”75 Stories are powerful because of their emotional appeal, identified in 
Aristotle’s classical study of rhetoric as pathos.76 Stories invite their listeners to 
enter the viewpoint of the characters and empathize with their perspective on 
events, moving us “to care, and hence pave the way to action.”77 Storytelling is 
also powerful because narrative “corresponds more closely to the manner in 
which the human mind makes sense of experience than does the conventional, 
 
70. Jean Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennalt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: Insights for 
Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOL. 437, 448–86 (2008) (surveying the 
psychological aspects of information-processing, memory, and cognitive heuristic biases that prevent people 
from conveying and gathering accurate information). 
71. Edward D. Ohlbaum, Basic Instinct: Case Theory and Courtroom Performance, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 
1, 18–23 (1993) (listing these among other factors that lead to the persuasiveness of a case theory). See also 
Naomi Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J 2475 (1993). 
72. Jerome Frank, Say It With Music, 61 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924 (1948). 
73. STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T, CAN’T, AND SHOULDN’T 
HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH 1–6 (2001); Ohlbaum, supra note 71, at 24–25; Binny Miller, Give Them 
Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994). 
74. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997). 
75. Id. at 187. See also Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and The Rule of Law: New Words, 
Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989). 
76. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 1.2 in ARISTOTLE: ON RHETORIC, A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 38–39 
(George A. Kennedy, trans. 1991). Aristotle’s distinction between pathos (emotional appeal), logos (logical 
appeal), and ethos (appeal based on the character or credibility of the speaker), has been highly influential in the 
development of modern rhetorical studies. Id. at ix–x. 
77. Massaro, supra note 75, at 2105. 
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abstracted rhetoric of law.”78 Effective advocates use narrative structures to 
construct storylines out of the facts of a case,79 exhort decision makers to play the 
narrative role of hero in a story of the quest for justice,80 and explain the 
development of the law as a story with a deep narrative structure.81 
The casebook method of instruction provides only limited opportunities for 
students to explore the complexities of factual analysis that will confront them in 
practice. The pre-digested statements of facts in appellate cases are the end 
products of a long process of factual development, investigation, discovery, 
analysis, and strategic choices made in advocacy.82 The casebook method does 
not help a student to study a case “from the front” and anticipate how to develop 
the facts moving forward.83 
3.  The Missing Analytical Frameworks for Teaching Transactional 
Planning 
A third shortcoming of the casebook method is its limitations in teaching 
transactional and other non-litigation law practices, particularly the work of 
business lawyers. Transactional practice encompasses commercial deal-making,84 
including deals involving contracts for acquisition of goods, contracts for 
services, and the creation of multi-party joint ventures.85 Other non-litigation 
business lawyering involves advising clients on internal operations, internal 
structuring, and compliance with regulatory and tax laws.86 The role of 
transactional lawyers has been defined specifically in terms of the value that 
lawyers add to transactions by reducing transaction costs, regulatory costs, and 
other costs associated with the transaction.87 More broadly speaking, “the 
 
78. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative 
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989). 
79. Binny Miller, Teaching Case Theory, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2002). 
80. Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 55, 64–65 (1992). 
81. Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. 
883, 886–90 (2010). 
82. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 36, at 601. 
83. Llewellyn, supra note 45, at 213–14. 
84. Shreya Atrey, O ‘The Damn Good Deal Lawyer’ Where Art Thou?, 13 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & 
CLINICAL L. 331, 337–38 (2011). 
85. George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 279, 289–90 (2009). 
86. Id. at 297. 
87. The seminal work in this area is Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills 
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). He suggested that lawyers add value to a transaction by 
functioning as “transaction cost engineers.” Id. at 243. See also Dent, supra note 85 (broadening Gilson’s focus 
on the role of lawyers in acquisitions and calling for a broader definition of the business lawyer’s role as an 
“enterprise architect”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 486 (2007) (empirically testing Gilson’s hypotheses about how lawyers add value to transactions); 
Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer’s 
View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189, 198–200 (1995) (providing a transactional 
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challenge facing a business lawyer is how to manage and allocate risk in the face 
of uncertainty.”88 
The conceptual theory underlying the basic skills component of transactional 
lawyering—what one author calls the “why you do what you do”—are a 
relatively recent development in legal education.89 However, commentators have 
noted significant differences between the skills and norms of litigators and 
transactional lawyers.90 The litigation context, in which casebook instruction 
resides, implicitly teaches students the skills of crafting the law into persuasive 
legal arguments.91 The non-litigation context requires different kinds of analyses 
and application of the law.92 For example, deal lawyers must be able to translate a 
party’s deal into the basic structural building blocks of a contract: 
representations, warranties, covenants, and conditions precedent.93 To add value 
to a deal, deal lawyers also need to understand the basic categories of non-legal 
business considerations that will matter to their clients, such as money 
considerations, risk allocation, the location of control in the future, how broadly 
or narrowly to draft standards, and terms covering the endgame of the deal 
relationship.94 The foundational skills have been said to include the ability to 
engage in cost-benefit analysis;95 the ability to identify the recurring structural 
problems that create transaction costs;96 and the ability to evaluate risks, structure 
agreements, negotiate terms, and draft documents.97 
The casebook method’s focus on appellate cases exposes students to deals 
that have gone bad, but does little to expose students to these underlying 
structures of analysis that transactional lawyers use to successfully engineer 
agreements that do not raise later disputes.98 Even in courses like contracts and 
property, where the bulk of the work lawyers do is transactional, the casebook 
method focuses on litigated cases, rather than the more common type of business 
 
lawyer’s view on Gilson’s thesis). 
88. Robert C. Illig, The Oregon Method: An Alternative Model for Teaching Transactional Law, 59 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 221, 222 (2009). 
89. See Atrey, supra note 84, at 340; Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions Into the 
Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 475, 479 (2002). 
90. Eric J. Gouvin, Teaching Business Lawyering in Law Schools: A Candid Assessment of the 
Challenges and Some Suggestions for Moving Ahead, 78 UMKC L. Rev. 429, 431 (2009); Stephen J. Friedman, 
Why Can’t Law Students Be More Like Lawyers?, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 81, 87–88 (2005). 
91. See Atrey, supra note 84, at 341; Tina L. Stark, Thinking Like a Deal Lawyer, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
223, 223–24 (2004). 
92. Stark, supra note 91, at 224. 
93. Id. at 225 (claiming that “there is an underlying similarity to all contacts” that applies “not only to a 
car purchase agreement and an employment contract agreement, but also to a multibillion-dollar acquisition 
agreement, a license agreement, and a construction contract”). 
94. Id. at 229–31. 
95. Bernstein, supra note 87, at 191. 
96. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 482. 
97. Id. at 478. 
98. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 434 (2009). 
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case studies that business schools use to teach their students forward-thinking 
business judgment.99 The litigation focus often carries over into the skills 
curriculum of law schools, where simulation courses and clinics continue to be 
“skewed toward litigation practice and give short shrift to transactional 
practice.”100 Moreover, unlike litigation, where students’ pre-law school 
understanding is shaped by multiple media images of lawyers in role,101 
transactional practice has no common cultural reference point, leaving students 
preparing for a transactional legal practice with a task akin to “trying to complete 
a jigsaw puzzle without the benefit of seeing the box.”102 
Law schools’ failure to teach students to “think like transactional lawyers” 
causes newly-minted lawyers to “fumble around and effectively muddle through 
problems without adding value,”103 feeding the negative view that many business 
clients already hold of lawyers.104 Notably, entry-level lawyers tend to view 
contractual provisions as boilerplate language without understanding “the 
purposes of those provisions and the thinking that underlies them.”105 Hence, they 
“stick too closely to precedents and retain unnecessary or inefficient terms 
because they are unfamiliar with the structure of the documents or do not trust 
their own judgment.”106 However, if lawyers function merely as draftsmen filling 
out pre-existing forms without exercising professional judgment, they fail to add 
value to a transaction.107 Even worse, improperly trained business lawyers may 
“overlawyer” cases,108 “seeing a problem behind every bush, overcompensating to 
avoid risk, [and] generating conflict.”109 
Although business lawyers eventually hone and calibrate their transactional 
skills in practice, the lack of preparation in law school leaves them on their own 
to “[s]omehow, in the midst of fourteen-hour days . . . take a step back and think 
about how the current transaction differs from the last and why that might be so, 
 
99. Dent, supra note 85, at 319; Celeste M. Hammond, Borrowing from the B Schools: The Legal Case 
Study as Course Materials for Transaction Oriented Elective Courses: A Response to the Challenges of the 
MacCrate Report and the Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching Report on Legal Education, 11 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 9, 12–13 (2009). 
100. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 430. 
101. Illig, supra note 88, at 225. 
102. Id. at 221. 
103. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 452. 
104. Gilson, supra note 87, at 241–42 (clients see business lawyers “at best as a transaction cost, part of a 
system of wealth redistribution from clients to lawyers”). 
105. Friedman, supra note 90, at 89. 
106. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 483. 
107. Id. at 479; Schwarcz, supra note 87, at 501 (finding based on empirical research that “transactional 
counsel reduce regulatory costs, and thus add value, primarily by performing transaction-regulatory legal work: 
by providing expertise in the law and regulations that generally govern the transaction and by understanding the 
rationale for the contractual provisions in the transaction documents). 
108. Bernstein, supra note 87, at 191, 193. 
109. Dent, supra note 85, at 311 (quoting JAMES C. FREUND, SMART NEGOTIATING: HOW TO MAKE 
GOOD DEALS IN THE REAL WORLD 186 (1992)). 
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and then carry the lesson forward to the next transaction.”110 Law school 
instruction could do more to help law students prepare for the transactional and 
business side of lawyering by developing pedagogical methods and delivering 
instruction that exposes law students to the analytical constructs they will need to 
plan, structure, and problem-solve in non-litigation settings. 
As this Part has explained, the lasting value of the appellate case dialogue 
method lies not in its efficiency in teaching substantive law, but in its facility in 
imparting a foundational set of lawyering skills and habits of thinking. To deliver 
a well-rounded professional education, law schools need not abandon the 
appellate case dialogue method of instruction, but they must be willing to move 
beyond it. The next Part explores in more detail the features of a well-balanced 
law school curriculum. 
II. TOWARD A WELL-BALANCED LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
To transcend the limitations of the appellate casebook method, law schools 
must strike a better balance among instruction in doctrinal knowledge, instruction 
in practice skills, and instruction in professional values.111 Law schools cannot 
reasonably achieve this balance by simply adding credit hours of lawyering skills 
courses until they are equal in proportion to the credit hours currently allocated to 
doctrinal instruction; balance requires an integration of skills and 
professionalism instruction with doctrinal learning.112 In addition to being 
integrated, a law school curriculum must be progressive, exposing students to a 
wider array of lawyering skills in increasingly challenging and less structured 
settings.113 Finally, although there is a temptation for traditional law faculty to 
“farm out” skills instruction to adjunct professors or isolate it in clinic and 
externship courses, a truly balanced curriculum must involve collaboration 
between the legal academy and the practicing bar.114 This Part will explain why 
the characteristics of integration, progression, and collaboration are so important. 
A.  A Common Core Pedagogy of Skills Instruction 
In 1944, Karl Llewellyn proposed a large-scale reorientation of legal 
education around the acquisition of what he called the “craft-skills of the 
lawyer.”115 In Llewellyn’s vision, after the first year of law school, instructional 
 
110. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 486. 
111. The Carnegie Report calls these the “three apprenticeships of professional education.” CARNEGIE 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 27–29. 
112. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2025. See also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 194–97; BEST 
PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 97–100. 
113. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2025. 
114. Id. at 2025–26. 
115. Llewellyn, supra note 45, at 216. 
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materials should shift from appellate cases to other kinds of materials; and law 
schools should select upper-level courses, not based on the importance of their 
subject-matter, but based on their suitability in helping students develop a 
broader range of skills.116 To achieve a balance of skills, knowledge, and 
professionalism, law schools must be willing, like Llewellyn, to rethink the tacit 
commitment to subject-matter coverage as the dominant organizing principle of 
the law school curriculum.117 
The first step in any such reorientation is recognizing that what we most 
often picture as “lawyering skills” instruction shares a common pedagogical 
structure with the case dialogue method. It has been well-accepted since at least 
the turn of the twentieth century that the case dialogue method inculcates a set of 
foundational cognitive lawyering skills.118 What is less commonly remarked is 
that the appellate case dialogue method also shares a common basis in standard 
experiential learning techniques. Experiential learning occurs in a repetitive cycle 
of (a) preparation for an experience, (b) performance in role, (c) reflection on 
one’s performance, and (d) synthesis of the experience with existing knowledge 
and other experience.119 In this process, the teacher is less focused on conveying 
material than on coaching the student through the process of preparing for an 
experience and reflecting on it.120 The cycle of preparing, doing, and reflecting 
also trains entry-level professionals in habits of reflective practice needed for 
continued professional growth throughout their careers.121 
Skills instruction assists the cycle of experiential learning by interposing 
instruction that develops the concepts and theories underlying the skills being 
taught, and provides reflective evaluation and feedback on the students’ 
performance.122 For example, in a clinic, students might be taught a conceptual 
framework that breaks down the steps that lawyers go through in analyzing the 
facts of a case and developing a fact investigation plan.123 Students then have an 
opportunity to apply that framework to a clinic case they are working on, and to 
reflect on the process in one-on-one supervision sessions and receive 
 
116. LLEWELLYN REPORT, supra note 45, at 366–67. 
117. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2058. 
118. Spiegel, supra note 6, at 582–83; Spencer, supra note 2, at 1977. 
119. J. P. OGILVY, LEARNING FROM PRACTICE: A PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT TEXT FOR LEGAL 
EXTERNS 3 (2d ed. 2007); Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of 
Learning to Learn from Experience through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 279, 285 
(1981). 
120. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Donald Schön, The Reflective Practitioner, and the Comparative Failures 
of Legal Education, 6 CLINCAL L. REV. 401, 415–17 (2000). 
121. Id. at 404–12. 
122. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 243 (1992) [hereinafter 
MACCRATE REPORT]. 
123. See KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 53, at 149–57. 
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individualized coaching that helps them through the process in the unstructured 
setting of real practice.124 
The appellate case method employs similar experiential learning techniques 
to teach legal analysis and reasoning by providing students with opportunities to 
perform those skills, supported by in-class guidance and feedback from the 
instructor.125 The Carnegie Foundation’s study of legal education describes how 
professors in first-year law school courses instill the foundational skills of 
“thinking like a lawyer” by using techniques of modeling, coaching, scaffolding, 
and fading.126 In the case dialogue method, professors will model the correct way 
to read a case by stating the relevant facts or holding of a case, and they will 
coach by providing feedback that directs students to focus on the relevant 
information.127 For students who are struggling, the professor will provide 
scaffolding that makes more explicit the structural elements that the professor is 
looking for, such as the holding of the case, the appellate court’s reasoning, and 
the extension or modification of the holding to other similar factual situations.128 
And, as students gain mastery over the techniques of case analysis, the instructor 
can fade, encouraging students to perform the skills of case analysis without 
explicit guidance.129 
When considered as a form of experiential learning, the case dialogue 
method falls short in a couple of aspects, neither of which is intrinsic to its 
design. First, it is almost always carried out in large classroom settings, where the 
professor calls on students one at a time, relying on other students to learn 
vicariously from watching the interaction.130 The other is that professors who are 
not sufficiently attuned to the skills development aspect of the case method 
approach may rush through it in an attempt to cover more substantive material 
and lose the focus on the techniques that they are teaching.131 However, when 
well-executed in class sizes that allow for sufficient student participation and 
interaction, the case dialogue method can fulfill its potential as experiential 
education in foundational lawyering skills.132 
Once the case dialogue method’s pedagogical structure is revealed as 
continuous with, rather than separate from, the pedagogy employed in teaching 
other lawyering skills, the keys to unlocking an integrated law school curriculum 
 
124. Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 
279–81 (1982). 
125. Shaw, supra note 30, at 1281–85. 
126. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 61. 
127. Id. at 61–62. 
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 60–63. 
130. Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design 
Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 351 (2001). 
131. See Petys, supra note 5, at 1274. 
132. Shaw, supra note 30, at 1278–85. 
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are in hand. Importantly, the recognition of a common pedagogical structure 
breaks down the perceived divide between doctrinal teaching as primarily 
theoretical and skills teaching as primarily practical, revealing both that 
experiential learning techniques pervade the case dialogue method and that skills 
instruction depends on teaching the conceptual theories underlying practice.133 
B.  Theories of Practice: “Making the Invisible Visible” 
Teaching lawyering skills is not simply a matter of sending students into 
practice settings and expecting them to learn from experienced practitioners. As 
Blackstone wrote in 1803, in his critique of the apprenticeship system, “if 
practice be the whole [a student] is taught, practice must also be the whole he 
will ever know: if he be uninstructed in the elements and first principles upon 
which the rule of practice is founded, the least variation from established 
precedents will totally distract and bewilder him.”134 As this quote suggests, a key 
component of experiential education is articulating the theories underlying 
practice, which are used to help students internalize what they absorb from 
practice experiences and transfer it to other contexts.135 
The challenge, according to Donald Schön, one of the leading figures in the 
theory of professional education,136 is to “solve the problem of describability, to 
figure out how to describe what [professionals] are doing in a way that allows 
other people also to learn.”137 The pedagogical techniques of the case dialogue 
method have unlocked the “problem of describability” with respect to the skills 
of legal analysis and reasoning by breaking down and articulating the steps 
through which experienced lawyers extract the relevant rules from appellate 
cases, “mak[ing] the invisible visible, both in the mind of the teacher and the 
mind of the learner.”138 
In Llewellyn’s time, the conceptual theories underlying other lawyering 
skills had yet to be articulated in ways that made them teachable. The “first great 
and immediate need and opportunity of legal education today,” he wrote in 1944, 
lies “in making their theory conscious and in giving elementary practice in their 
use.”139 Llewellyn was hopeful that the mid-1940s would see growth in the 
 
133. See generally Spiegel, supra note 6 (arguing that doctrinal instruction and clinical education are each 
based in both theory and practice). 
134. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND sec. 1 (Lonang Institute 2005) 
(1765–1769), available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-001.htm (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (emphasis added). 
135. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 62; David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Taking Lawyering Skills 
Training Seriously, 10 CLIN. L. REV. 191, 199 (2003). 
136. Neumann, supra note 120, at 40 1–03. 
137. Donald A. Schön, Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 231, 247 (1995). 
138. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 59. 
139. LLEWELLYN REPORT, supra note 45, at 217. 
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theoretical conceptualization of a wider range of craft-skills, fueled by the return 
to the legal academy of a generation of law teachers who had dispersed into 
practice during World War II.140 During their wartime sabbaticals, law instructors 
immersed themselves in law practice “with . . . teachers’ understanding of how 
experience in practice can be organized for teaching,”141 making them ideally 
suited, in Llewellyn’s eyes, to take on the project of re-inventing the law school 
curriculum. 
Llewellyn’s hope went largely unfulfilled in the post-War period, which saw 
increasing standardization and curricular stagnation in legal education.142 
However, it gained traction a couple of decades later, when the Ford Foundation 
poured money into the legal academy for the purpose of creating real-practice 
legal clinics in law schools,143 and a generation of clinical teachers who remained 
embedded in practice began to develop the conceptual frameworks for teaching 
other lawyering skills. The articulation of the conceptual frameworks underlying 
lawyering skills was the brainchild of Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton, who co-
authored the seminal textbook in lawyering skills, The Lawyering Process: 
Materials for Clinical Instruction in Advocacy.144 With the rapid growth of 
clinical programs in law schools across the country, course materials for clinical 
teaching were in high demand.145 Bellow and Moulton answered that demand 
with a set of teaching materials that provided a breakdown, description, and 
critical analysis of the lawyering process in terms of its discrete tasks and roles, 
such as “interviewing, counseling, negotiat[ing], drafting, oral advocacy,” and 
factual investigation.146 Bea Moulton has explained how she and Gary Bellow 
explored the lawyering process from scratch, breaking down the tasks in which 
lawyers engaged into their component parts.  They also researched materials 
from other disciplines—psychology, sociology, decision theory, probability 
 
140. Id. at 364–65. 
141. Id. at 365 (emphasis in original). 
142. STEVENS, supra note 18 at 205–31. 
143. Between 1968 and 1978, the Ford Foundation granted $11 million to the Council on Legal Education 
for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) to provide support to clinical legal education programs. Margaret 
Martin Barry, et al., Clinical Legal Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 19 
(2000). The Department of Education picked up where the Ford Foundation left off and appropriated in excess 
of $87 million to fund clinical legal education programs from 1978 to 1997. 
144. For a description of the importance and impact of this early textbook, see Susan Bryant & Elliott S. 
Milstein, Reflections upon the 25th Anniversary of The Lawyering Process: An Introduction to the Symposium, 
10 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2003). 
145. Michael Meltsner, Celebrating The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 327 (2003); Bea 
Moulton, In Memoriam: Gary Bellow, 114 HARV. L. REV. 416, 420 (2000) (“Clinicians were starting from 
scratch in school after school, helping students represent thousands and thousands of poor people. They needed 
a book.”). 
146. Gary Bellow & Earl Johnson, Reflections on the University of Southern California Clinical 
Semester, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 664, 673 (1971). 
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analysis, game theory—that would bring theoretical perspective and critical 
depth to the analysis of basic lawyering tasks.147 
As lawyering skills instruction has expanded and matured over the years,148 
the raw material now exists for teaching the analytical frameworks for a broad 
range of “fundamental lawyering skills.”149 The skills identified in the early 
clinical teaching materials focused on the litigation context.150 However, a 
growing number of law professors are now developing similar vocabularies of 
practice in the transactional context as well.151 As these transactional law teachers 
articulate the conceptual and analytical frameworks that underlie transactional 
practice, they are developing useful teaching materials for others that can be used 
in transactional skills instruction.152 
C. Collaboration Between Academics and Practitioners 
The development of a robust analytical literature on the conceptual basis and 
underlying theory of lawyering skills makes it possible to implement, in concrete 
terms, what Karl Llewellyn could only imagine: a well-balanced law school 
curriculum organized around acquiring the “craft-skills” of lawyers.153 However, 
there remains the question of how best to implement this ideal. As commentators 
note with dismay, law faculties are dominated by professors with little practice 
experience upon which to draw in teaching a broader range of lawyering skills.154 
One tempting solution is to abjure responsibility and delegate the job to adjunct 
professors on the theory that they are better situated to teach the practice of law. 
However, the “farming out” model of skills instruction is also unsatisfactory.155 
The central dilemma of professional skills instruction is that, while experienced 
practitioners have high levels of professional experience and competence, they 
 
147. Bea Moulton, Looking Back at The Lawyering Process, 10 CLIN. L. REV. 33, 50–51 (2003); 
Moulton, supra note 131, at 419. 
148. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555 
(1980) (examining various theories behind and approaches to lawyering); see also Symposium: The 25th 
Anniversary of Gary Bellow’s and Bea Moulton’s The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, et seq. 
(2003) (discussing different approaches to lawyering through a symposium of clinical textbooks authors). 
149. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 122, at 138–41. 
150. Moulton, supra note 147, at 35. 
151. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 91; Karl S. Okamoto, Teaching Transactional Lawyering, 1 DREXEL L. 
REV. 69 (2009); Fleischer, supra note 89. 
152. Stark, supra note 91, at 229–31 (extracting certain commonly recurring issues—money, risk, 
control, standards, and endgame—that she used to formulate a “five-prong framework” for teaching law 
students how to analyze business issues that might arise in a deal); Fleischer, supra note 89, at 483–90 
(discussing an adaptation of Gilson’s “transaction cost engineering” model for use in skills courses on deal-
making). 
153. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 89, at 491. 
154. Newton, supra note 4, at 112; Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479. 
155. LLEWELLYN REPORT, supra note 45, at 365. 
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do not necessarily have the ability to translate this expertise into “teachable 
experience and competence.”156 
Cognitive psychologists explain why it is difficult for an expert practitioner 
to articulate the underlying analytical frameworks of practice into a conceptual 
vocabulary that makes them teachable and transferable.157 In the process of 
developing expertise, professionals internalize simplified schemas for structuring 
relevant information.158 When confronted with a new problem, experts draw on 
these internalized schemas to hone in on the relevant facts, analyze the problem 
according to its deep structure, and formulate solutions based on previous 
experience with structurally similar problems.159 Professionals’ tacit knowledge is 
exhibited by competent behavior, but not necessarily accurately described by 
those who exhibit it.160 An expert problem-solver will move through the 
intermediate steps of reasoning so automatically and unconsciously that the 
process will seem intuitive.161 Those who are good at what they do are not 
necessarily the best teachers. The best teachers are those who can explain what 
they are doing by breaking good practice down into its elemental steps and 
articulating the theories underlying that practice.162 
It requires sustained intellectual work at the intersection of theory and 
practice to bring to the surface the structures that underlie expert practice and to 
articulate them into frameworks that are useful for teaching. When Bellow and 
Moulton began the project of developing teaching materials for clinical 
instruction, they found that existing literature on law practice—which “took a 
strong ‘this is the way to do it’ perspective”—was not going to be much help.163 
As Moulton later put it, “most of us in those days had no framework or 
vocabulary for describing what the task involved, and how to get better at it. We 
just did it, perhaps imitating whatever senior lawyers we had been fortunate 
enough to be around.”164 More recently, in developing materials for teaching a 
new set of transactional skills, the new theorists of transactional practice have 
found existing practice-based materials unhelpful.165 As Victor Fleischer wrote, to 
be useful as teaching materials, there needs to be a conceptual framework and 
“[t]o the extent transaction-oriented teaching materials exist[ed] at all, they 
 
156. LLEWELLYN REPORT, supra note 45, at 365. 
157. Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Problem Solving, 11 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 149, 167 (2004). 
158. Id.; STEPHEN ELLMAN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING 353 (2009). 
159. Krieger, supra note 157, at 168; Ian Weinstein, Lawyering in the State of Nature: Instinct and 
Automaticity in Legal Problem Solving, 23 VT. L. REV. 1, 24–26 (1998). 
160. Schön, supra note 137, at 243. 
161. ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 158, at 351; Weinstein, supra note 159, at 26. 
162. Shaw, supra note 30, at 1298. 
163. Moulton, supra note 147, at 50; Bellow & Johnson, supra note 146, at 673. 
164. Moulton, supra note 147, at 46. 
165. See Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479; Stark, supra note 91, at 228.  
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tend[ed] to resemble a cookbook.”166 When Tina Stark did an informal survey of 
law partners, asking them how they identified business issues that would “add 
value to the deal,” she got answers like it “requires a sixth sense,” or “[y]ou 
know one when you see one.”167 
This is not to say that adjunct professors are incapable of developing skills 
courses that articulate and teach the conceptual frameworks underlying good 
practice; however, it is a mistake for academic law professors to simply assume 
that if they farm their students out to experienced practitioners, experiential 
learning will necessarily occur. Clinical professors, who remain engaged in 
active practice from within the walls of the academy, are ideally situated to 
articulate the conceptual frameworks underlying good practice; and the presence 
of active practitioners in the profession of teaching has done much to advance the 
development of teaching materials for a wide range of lawyering skills.168 
However, the artificially low caseloads in clinic teaching eventually distance 
clinical professors from the rhythms and approaches of practicing lawyers.169 
A well-balanced curriculum is more likely to emerge from a series of 
collaborations between faculty members whose primary engagement in teaching 
brings a focus on the kinds of conceptual structures that are helpful to student 
learning and experienced lawyers who can provide perspective on what 
practicing lawyers do.170 Some of the recent innovations in teaching transactional 
lawyering involve such collaborations, where students learn and apply the 
conceptual frameworks of deals and deal-making under the direction of law 
school faculty members and practicing lawyers share their perspectives or 
demonstrate their approaches to the same material.171 
D. Progression of Skills Development: Simulations, Clinics, and Externships 
In addition to covering a broader range of lawyering skills, a well-balanced 
law school curriculum must recognize the unique values of different types of 
experiential education and use them to structure a progression of learning 
 
166. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479. 
167. Stark, supra note 91, at 228. Karl Okamoto got similar answers over years of informally asking deal 
lawyers what makes someone great at their craft. Okamoto, supra note 151, at 70–71. 
168. Stacy Caplow, A Year in Practice: The Journal of a Reflective Clinician, 3 Clin. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 
(1996). 
169. Id. 
170. See e.g., Fleischer, supra note 89.  
171. See e.g., id. at 491–92 (stating that in the first half of the author’s Deals class, students learn the 
conceptual frameworks for deal-making and in the second half they study actual deals by analyzing them and 
then hearing from the lawyers or principals involved in the deal they just analyzed); Illig, supra note 88, at 234–
37 (describing Transactional Practice Labs that are taught by adjunct professors and appended to substantive 
law courses); Okamoto, supra note 151, at 87–90 (describing a Transactional Lawyering course where 
professors taught conceptual frameworks for student simulations and then practicing lawyers provided 
demonstrations of how they would approach the same simulated exercises). 
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experiences that increases in challenge and complexity.172 The common practice 
in legal education has been to structure the first year of law school with a 
uniform slate of required courses and then to leave second and third year students 
largely on their own to fill out the balance of their credits from among a wide 
array of electives with little or no guidance.173 As Brent Newton put it, “[a]fter 
completing their mandatory courses, law students at many schools are left at sea 
in choosing and scheduling courses.”174 “Often students end up taking a 
somewhat random combination of courses . . . .”175 
Although the American Bar Association now requires all law students to 
complete a minimal amount of professional skills training,176 efforts to remediate 
the skills deficit in legal education often fall into a common error of lumping 
together all types of experiential education. For example, the American Bar 
Association is considering changes to its accreditation standards for law schools 
that would require all law graduates to complete at least six credits in “one or 
more experiential course(s)” that “must be: (i) simulation course(s); or (ii) faculty 
supervised clinical course(s); or (iii) field placement(s).”177 This kind of 
undifferentiated skills requirement treats as interchangeable what are actually 
three distinctive and complementary pedagogical methods used in experiential 
education.178 
Simulations are the simplest form of experiential learning and have the 
benefit of permitting instructors to isolate the particular skill or skills being 
 
172. See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A SURVEY OF LAW 
SCHOOL CURRICULA: 1992-2002 13-16 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/legaled/ publications/curriculumsurvey/Curriculum_Survey.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA 
2002 Curriculum Study] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
173. The trend toward unstructured electives in the upper levels of law school has been increasing. See 
ABA Curriculum Study, supra note 172; ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA: 2001-2010, Executive Summary 15-16 (2012), available at http://www. 
abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1341346391LawSchoolCurriculaSurveyExecSummary.pdf 
[hereinafter Executive Summary of ABA 2012 Curriculum Study] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
174. Newton, supra note 4, at 87. 
175. Id. 
176. The current standard requires “substantial instruction” in “other professional skills generally 
regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation in the legal profession.” ABA STANDARDS FOR 
ACCREDITATION OF LAW SCHOOLS 2012–2013, Standard 302(4), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/legal_education/resources/standards.html. However, the ABA interprets “substantial” has been 
interpreted to mean that the skills instruction must “engage each student in skills performances that are assessed 
by the instructor” rather than a particular number of credits. ABA STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF LAW 
SCHOOLS 2012–2013, Interpretation 302-3, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/ 
resources/standards.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
177. ABA STANDARDS REVIEW COMM., April ‘13 SRC Meeting Materials 54 (April 2013), 54 (April 
2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/standards_ 
review_documents/april_2013/2013_apr_src_meeting_agenda_and_drafts.authcheckdam.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review).  
178. Roy Stuckey, Teaching with Purpose: Defining and Achieving Desired Outcomes in Clinical Law 
Courses, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 807, 812 (2007). 
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taught.179 In simulations, students “perform law-related tasks in hypothetical 
situations,”—role-playing interactions like a client interview or witness 
examination and working with documents that might be found in a lawyer’s case 
file.180 Although teaching with simulations is similar to using problems in 
classroom instruction, simulations are more elaborate than problems, which are 
used primarily to illustrate issues of law rather than to teach professional skills.181 
Some simulation courses focus on the repetition of a particular skill or set of 
skills, such as a course on trial advocacy, client interviewing and counseling, or 
negotiation; others focus on a particular lawyering task, such as deal-making, 
where students engage in a series of exercises that take a deal from beginning to 
end.182 
Simulations necessarily simplify the factual and interpersonal complexity of 
actual lawyering, permitting the instructor to hone in on improving performance 
of the particular skills that are the target of the instruction.183 In the process, it 
omits other skills that are interconnected in the practice of law. For example, a 
course in Trial Advocacy will focus on developing a case theory, presenting 
evidence, examining witnesses, and making opening and closing statements, but 
it will not teach students how to investigate the facts that come out in trial or 
role-play the lawyers’ meetings with the clients. A course on Interviewing and 
Counseling will focus on the interactions between the lawyer and the client and 
teach techniques for gathering information from clients and assisting clients in 
their decision-making processes. However, it will focus on these skills outside of 
the larger context of legal research, factual investigation, and dispute resolution 
that shape the lawyer’s advice to clients.184 
In clinics, students are given primary responsibility for practicing law under 
the direct supervision of faculty members.185 In-house clinics are taught in the 
context of a law office created within the law school to provide students with the 
opportunity to practice law under the supervision of faculty members.186 Unlike 
simulations, where other students or actors play pre-determined roles, clinic 
students confront the complexities of real-life interactions with clients and other 
participants in the legal system187 and perform professional skills in unstructured 
 
179. See generally BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 181. 
180. Stuckey, supra note 178; see also BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 179–80. 
181. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 442. 
182. Jay M. Feinman, Simulations: An Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 470 (1995); BEST 
PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 179–80. 
183. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 442. 
184. Id. 
185. Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508, 511 (1992) 
[hereinafter Report on the In-House Clinic]; BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 188–89; Elliott Milstein, 
Clinical Legal Education in the United States: In-House Clinics, Externships, and Simulations, 51 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 375, 376 (2001). 
186. Milstein, supra note 185, at 376. 
187. Report on the In-House Clinic, supra note 185, at 511. 
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settings where the facts are often unclear, inconsistent, and ambiguous.188 
Moreover, clinics provide the unparalleled opportunity to integrate legal 
knowledge, factual uncertainty, interpersonal relationships, and ethical 
challenges arising in real practice settings.189 
Although the core of the clinical experience is the student’s assumption of 
the lawyering role in real cases or matters,190 clinic teaching involves a 
combination of other methods to support learning in that role: classroom 
instruction, supervision meetings, and case rounds.191 The classroom component 
of clinic teaching permits group teaching of the conceptual theories underlying 
practice, providing students with a vocabulary and framework for their real-
practice experiences.192 In supervision meetings with their professors, students 
receive feedback on their work on clinic cases, debrief past events, and plan for 
future events under sometimes intensive questioning designed to analyze possible 
choices and uncover hidden assumptions.193 Case rounds provide an opportunity 
for clinic students to work together to brainstorm a problem, debrief an 
experience, or discuss common themes arising in their cases.194 Although clinic 
casework is often unpredictable and the lawyering experiences may vary from 
student to student, the small and intensive student-teacher relationships allow the 
teacher to individualize and calibrate guidance and feedback to the individual 
learning needs of the students.195 
In externships, students are placed in practice “settings external to the law 
school,” such as law offices, public interest agencies, or judicial chambers.196 
Externship students might represent clients, appear in court, or complete research 
and writing projects, and they get the opportunity to observe or assist lawyers or 
judges in their day-to-day work.197 In the field placements, attorneys or judges 
supervise the work of externs directly, with law school faculty providing a 
supportive pedagogical role to help maximize the educational benefit of the 
students’ field experiences.198 Externships often include a classroom component, 
 
188. Id. at 512. 
189. Karen Tokarz, et al., Legal Education and the Legal Profession in Crisis: The Need for a New Law 
School Curriculum with Expanded Experiential Legal Education and Clinical Courses for All Law Students, 43 
WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013). 
190. Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 283–
89 (1982). 
191. Milstein, supra note 185, at 377. 
192. Id. at 378; Kreiling, supra note 119, at 301–11. 
193. See generally Peter Toll Hoffman, The Stages of the Clinical Supervisory Relationship, 4 ANTIOCH 
L.J. 301 (1986) (describing the variety of methods used in clinical supervision and their usefulness in different 
stages of the student’s progress in the clinic). 
194. See generally Susan Bryant & Elliott S. Milstein, Rounds: A “Signature Pedagogy” for Clinical 
Education?, 14 CLIN. L. REV. 195 (2007) (describing the purposes and methods of teaching in case rounds). 
195. Quigley, supra note 51, at 488. 
196. Milstein, supra note 185, at 376. 
197. Stuckey, supra note 178, at 812. 
198. Id. at 811–12. 
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where students may explore issues relating to lawyering, such as the development 
of professional identity or role, professional ethics, problem-solving, reflective 
practice, or work-life balance.199 Externship students are usually also required to 
set and periodically revisit specific learning goals for themselves,200 and to keep a 
journal or do other reflective writing.201 The unique benefits of externship 
experiences are their authenticity; externships expose students to the practice of 
law in settings “closely similar to the actual setting in which [the] knowledge 
[they] acquire later will be used.”202 However, because externships rely on 
practicing lawyers for the direct supervision of student legal work, they do not 
offer the same intensive opportunities for close instructor feedback, reflection, 
and analysis of the lawyering experience that clinics provide.203 
Rather than viewing these different types of experiential learning as 
interchangeable, a well-balanced curriculum should move students through a 
series of experiential learning opportunities that begin with explicit guidance in 
structured environments like simulations and move into intensive coaching, 
supervision, and feedback as students perform in unstructured real-practice 
settings.204 However, a sensible progression through experiential learning does 
not map neatly onto the three types of experiential courses because each type of 
experiential learning provides within it a range of possibilities for less and more 
challenging experiences.205 Simulations, for example, can range from simple 
exercises allowing students to learn some basic information about the conceptual 
framework for a skill and perform an isolated task to a complex, multi-part 
extended experience that ranges over the course of an entire semester and 
integrates several lawyering tasks and skills.206 Moreover, some types of legal 
work, such as high-stakes financial transactions, are best suited to study in an 
extended simulation format rather than a real-practice setting because “[n]o client 
would entrust a multi-million dollar transaction to law students.”207 
Within the realm of supervised real-practice experience, Susan Brooks has 
distinguished between two kinds of roles that a student might play: a “mentee” 
relationship where they engage in supportive legal work as they shadow and 
observe lawyers in practice, or a “first chair” role of representing clients directly 
 
199. See generally, OGILVY, ET AL., supra note 119 (covering these among other topics in a general 
textbook for use in conjunction with externships). 
200. Id. at 11–14. 
201. Id. at 199–203. 
202. Id. at 3; BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 198–99. 
203. Report on the In-House Clinic, supra note 185, at 511. 
204. Susan L. Brooks, Meeting the Professional Identity Challenge in Legal Education Through a 
Relationship-Centered Experiential Curriculum, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 395, 412–13 (2012). 
205. See Gouvin, supra note 90, at 441-42; 
206. See id. at 441–46 (describing a range of different approaches to using simulations to teach 
transactional lawyering in doctrinal courses). 
207. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 485–86. 
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under supervision.208 Clinics will almost always place students in a “first-chair” 
role, while most externships keep students within a “mentee” role.209 However, 
when compared to externship placements in which students take on more “first 
chair” responsibilities with less guidance and feedback, the low caseload and 
close supervision of a clinic can serve as an intermediate and preparatory step. 
Complicating the picture is the often forgotten fact that law students are 
contemporaneously working at part-time and summer jobs, where they may be 
placed in a range of practice settings providing them with both mentee and first-
chair experiences. 
To structure a progression of experiential learning into their curricula, law 
schools have begun to orchestrate students’ movement through a series of 
learning experiences that provide increasing levels of complexity with skills-
based course requirements.210 For example, schools are increasingly adding 
courses to the first year that introduce basic aspects of lawyering skills as an 
introduction to the lawyering process or the problem-solving role of lawyers.211 
Some schools have provided skills structure to the upper-levels of the curriculum 
by requiring students to take a certain number of upper-level skills courses or 
requiring every student to take a real-practice clinic or externship experience.212 
The most notable effort to structure these experiences into a progression—rather 
than simply to require them—has been Washington & Lee’s introduction of an 
“experiential third year” comprised of clinics, externships, and capstone courses 
with extensive simulations.213 
These are all laudable efforts and can serve as models for innovation 
elsewhere. But even well-intentioned law school faculties confront barriers as 
they approach curricular reform, and these barriers may seem even more 
daunting in current times of shrinking budgets and lower enrollments.214 The next 
Part describes some strategies for overcoming these barriers by analyzing more 
carefully the perceived costs of curricular innovation, and providing concrete 
suggestions for change that are particularly suited to the environment of law 
schools today.215 
 
208. Brooks, supra note 204, at 412–13. 
209. Peter A. Joy, The Cost of Clinical Legal Education, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUSTICE 309, 322 (2012). 
210. See infra Part III.B.1. 
211. Id. 
212. See Tokarz et al., supra note 189. 
213. WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY NEW THIRD YEAR REFORM, http://www.law.wlu.edu/thirdyear/ 
(last visited June 11, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). For a more in-depth discussion of 
programs that require substantial skills instruction and clinics or externships, see Tokarz, et al, supra note 189. 
214. See infra Part III.  
215. Id. 
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III. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO INNOVATION IN THE LAW SCHOOL 
CURRICULUM 
When the issue of reforming the law school curriculum to include more 
professional skills instruction is raised, it is often accompanied by an almost 
immediate repetition of the mantra that such ideas are nice but the cost of 
intensive, one-on-one supervision in experiential courses is prohibitively high.216 
In the current era of soaring tuition, a tightening job market, and declining 
student enrollments,217 it is especially important to examine carefully how 
curricular reform can occur in ways that are cost-sensitive. This Part will explore 
the cost issue in more detail and offer suggestions for cost-sensitive re-
deployment of resources to further the ends of curricular reform.218 
A. Defining the Costs of Curricular Reform 
1. Monetary Costs 
The primary reason that experiential education is said to be too costly is that 
quality instruction that supports experiential learning requires a low student-
teacher ratio to permit multiple opportunities for performance, feedback, and 
reflection.219 Law school clinics are probably the most expensive form of 
experiential legal education in these terms, both because the student-teacher ratio 
usually stays in the range of eight to one or ten to one,220 and because it takes the 
dedicated attention of a full-time teacher to maintain the high level of supervision 
of actual cases that clinic teaching demands.221 Externships require less 
investment of faculty resources because volunteer attorney mentors directly 
supervise the student work. However, to provide a sound pedagogical framework 
for on-site learning, externships still require significant faculty investment in 
one-on-one meetings with students, field supervisors, and other support for 
 
216. See e.g,. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 36, at 603; Joy, supra note 209, at 309-10; Illig, supra note 
88, at 231–32. 
217. TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 2–6. 
218. See infra Part III.A.1. 
219. See generally Gouvin, supra note 90, at 444. 
220. Report on the In-House Clinic, supra note 185, at 538. More recent data indicates that average 
student-teacher ratios fall within the range of five to eight students (40.9% of those surveyed) and nine to 
twelve students (32.3% of those surveyed). DAVID A. SANTACROCE & ROBERT R. KUEHN, CENTER FOR THE 
STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION: THE 2010-11 SURVEY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION 16 (2012), 
available at http://www.csale.org/files/CSALE.Report.on.2010-11.Survey.5.16.12.Revised.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
221. Report on  the In-House Clinic, supra note 185, at 511 (“Although the clinical movement began with 
practitioners used as supervisors, many clinical teachers came to believe that student supervision by 
practitioners was problematic for a methodology in which teaching was not incidental to the enterprise but 
rather its primary function.”). 
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feedback and reflection.222 According to one set of guidelines, the appropriate 
student-faculty ratio in externships should be no more than sixteen to one if 
taught in a seminar format and ten to one if taught through individual tutorials.223 
Simulations are similarly structured to permit students to perform in role and 
receive individualized feedback, similarly limiting the size to which they can 
grow.224 
It makes sense, in terms of simple math, to say that if a greater percentage of 
a law school’s curriculum is to be delivered in settings with lower student-teacher 
ratios, law school education will cost more. However, this “simple math” 
reasoning overlooks the realities associated with the costs of legal education; and 
in so doing, it overlooks opportunities for expanding experiential education in 
ways that are cost-sensitive. 
First, the argument overlooks the most basic question: more expensive 
compared to what? Lower student-teacher ratios improve the quality of student 
engagement and learning across the board, including in doctrinal courses.225 
Indeed, one of the major drawbacks of the case method approach is its reliance 
on self-directed, vicarious learning by the majority of students in a classroom, 
while the professor engages a few students in intensive, one-on-one exchanges.226 
The pedagogical objectives of the case dialogue method are also better achieved 
when the class size is small enough to permit the professor to call on students 
multiple times throughout the semester and engage a larger percentage of the 
class in structured, give-and-take discussions.227 
Second, as Peter Joy recently described, the cost of lower student-teacher 
ratios must be put into context by noting the other costs that have driven up the 
sticker price of legal education in recent times.228 Although law schools’ 
investment in smaller-enrollment experiential courses has been one factor driving 
the increase, it is surpassed by other categories of expenditure.229 Most notably, in 
recent years, law school faculty members have earned steadily more money to 
teach a steadily decreasing average course load.230 Indeed, Robert Kuehn’s recent 
 
222. See e.g. Laurie Barron, Learning How to Learn: Carnegie’s Third Apprenticeship, 18 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 101 (2011) (describing the development of an on-site mid-semester meeting process). 
223. J.P. Ogilvy, Guidelines for the Evaluation of Legal Externship Programs, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 155, 
165 (2003). 
224. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 443–44. 
225. Schwartz, supra note 130, at 351–52. 
226. Id. 
227. Newton, supra note 4, at 101–02. 
228. Joy, supra note 209, at 311 (describing rising tuition costs over the past three decades that 
significantly outpace inflation). 
229. Id. at 315–18 (noting the costs of building renovation and construction and of increases in average 
faculty salaries). 
230. Id. at 316–18. Moreover, increases in tuition during the boom years have not always been 
attributable to actual costs: some schools drive tuition costs up simply because they can and because it enhances 
their prestige to do so. Id. at 311–13. 
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study of the “pricing” of clinical legal education suggests that there is no 
relationship between a school’s choice to require or guarantee a clinic to every 
student and its tuition.231 
Low student-teacher ratios remain a legitimate cost factor to consider, but the 
“silver lining” in the cloud of precipitously-dropping law school enrollments is 
overall student-faculty ratios have been in sharp decline.232 If law schools have 
the authority to lay faculty off in proportion to the reductions in their tuition 
revenues, overall student-teacher ratios could remain constant, but tenure and 
other forms of security of position limit these choices.233 As a result, schools that 
have secured the faculty positions of clinical teachers in boom years of student 
enrollments will suddenly find they are now able to accommodate a larger 
percentage of their student body in their existing clinics and externship 
programs.234 And, student-faculty ratios in other upper-level elective courses are 
likely to drop, permitting greater incorporation of experiential teaching methods 
into those courses as well.235 The biggest threat to the quality of experiential 
educational programs is that the faculty who teach them may be particularly 
vulnerable to layoffs, compared with their colleagues who teach in the 
classroom.236 
The monetary cost of experiential education, while not imaginary, has always 
been questionable as the primary justification for holding back on curricular 
reform.237 When considered in the context of other cost-drivers of legal education, 
the choice not to develop a robust experiential program appears to be more a 
question of priority than necessity. However, in the new environment of legal 
education, the monetary cost barriers to curricular reform are fast fading into the 
background; in many ways, the time has never been better for schools to offer 
experiential education to their students. However, to do so, law schools must be 
creative in redeploying the relative surplus in faculty-teaching resources that 
many will likely be experiencing in the next few years.238 
 
231. Robert R. Kuehn, Pricing Clinical Legal Education, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318042 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
232. See TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 2–6.  
233. The ABA requires law schools to “afford to full-time clinical faculty members a form of security of 
position reasonably similar to tenure.” ABA STANDARDS FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 
405(c) (2012). 
234. See TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 2–6.  
235. See id.  
236. Compliance and enforcement with the ABA standards governing the security of position of clinical 
professors has been problematic. Recent survey data indicates that approximately 20% of faculty members 
teaching in clinics are tenured and another 7% have clinical tenure. Another 17.5% have long-term contracts of 
five years or more. For a more detailed description of the history and enforcement of this requirement, see Peter 
A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of ABA Standards for Clinical Faculty, 75 TENN. L. REV. 183 (2008). 
Given the history of enforcement, some schools will find themselves in the position of laying off the very 
faculty members who are best qualified to be leaders in curricular reform due to economic necessity. 
237. Joy, supra note 209, at 309–10.   
238. A common objection at this point in the discussion is that faculty members simply lack the 
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2. Other Costs 
The prospect of redeploying existing faculty teaching resources away from 
traditional doctrinal instruction and toward experiential education raises two 
other kinds of cost issues. One is the cost to students of “spending” their 
discretionary, upper-level law school credits on experiential instruction.239 The 
other is the cost to faculty in terms of the time, effort, and imagination that it 
takes to develop or redesign courses that integrate a broader range of professional 
skills instruction and to learn to teach in new and unfamiliar ways.240 
To illustrate these costs to students in expending discretionary credits, I use 
the example of my own experience at Hamline University School of Law.  
Hamline recently adopted an experiential progression plan for integrating skills 
instruction throughout the curriculum that will apply to students who enter in the 
fall of 2014. Hamline had already recently developed a two-credit, first-year 
lawyering course called Practice, Problem-Solving, and Professionalism, which 
focuses on introducing students to lawyering skills, professional identity, and 
professional role through a variety of assignments, exercises, interactions with 
practicing attorneys, and simulated role-plays.241 The plan for experiential 
progression was to build on this first-year introduction to skills by requiring 
students to take two one-credit lawyering skills lab modules in the second year of 
law school and twelve other credits in professional skills courses in the upper-
level curriculum. Hamline offers a wide range of skills courses, clinics, and 
externships; and, with projected declines in student enrollment, offering enough 
slots to meet these proposed requirements was not an issue. However, it quickly 
became apparent that the proposed experiential requirements were on a collision 
course with both core bar instruction and with students’ participation in some of 
 
competencies to engage in instructional methods that deviate from the traditional case dialogue method. 
However, I believe those who raise that objection overstate it for two reasons. First, as demonstrated in Parts I 
and II, there are a lot of similarities in pedagogical structure between the case dialogue method and other skills 
instruction, and there is reason to expect that faculties with competencies in one kind of skills instruction, a high 
level of intelligence, and a proper grounding in the theories underlying other skills, can learn to adapt their 
methods. Second, much of the frustration vented in the direction of law schools as a whole is based on a 
stereotype of professors with PhDs and no practice experience and informed, if at all, by experience with elite 
law schools. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34–42 and n.15 (1992) (discussing complaints based on observations of 
practices at elite law schools and a survey he circulated to his former clerks who had largely graduated from 
these law schools). The applicability of these stereotypes to non-elite schools (or schools not striving to be elite 
by replicating the hiring practices at elite schools) is questionable. 
239. See generally Joy, supra note 209 (discussing the function and expenses related to clinical legal 
training).  
240. Id. 
241. For a more lengthy description of the development and implementation of this course, see generally 
Bobbi McAdoo et al., It’s Time to Get It Right: Problem-Solving in the First-Year Curriculum, 39 WASH. U. J. 
L. & POL’Y 39 (2012). 
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Hamline’s certificate programs in Health Law, Business Law, and Dispute 
Resolution. 
Hamline has a fairly typical law school curriculum that—like most schools—
requires instruction in the usual line-up of first-year subjects.242 The law school 
requires upper level students to take a smattering of additional courses including 
at least two credits of Professional Responsibility, International Law, and a two-
credit seminar.243 When students take the forty-two credits needed to meet 
Hamline’s graduation requirements and add the thirty-eight credits it takes to 
cover all thirteen of the non-required courses that teach subjects tested on the bar 
examination, the total reaches eighty credits. Students who elect to take all of the 
bar courses offered in the upper-level curriculum have only eight remaining 
credits to spend.244 In the end, a significant core of the Hamline faculty was 
unwilling to pass a set of course requirements that prevent students from taking 
as many bar courses as they wanted to take245 and cut back on the number of 
required credits, while retaining the overall progressive structure of the plan.246 
The Hamline experience drives home some of the deeper challenges 
curricular innovation faces. Developing new and innovative experiential courses 
and adding them as electives that students can choose is a good thing, and if law 
schools build a robust skills and experiential program, at least some students will 
take full advantage of it.247 But the traditional law school curriculum is set in its 
 
242. Within the first two years, Hamline students are required to take: Contracts (6 credits); Torts I (3 
credits); Civil Procedure (6 credits); Criminal Law (3 credits); Property (3 credits); Constitutional Law I (3 
credits); Professional Responsibility (2 credits); Legal Research and Writing (5 credits in the first year and 2 
credits thereafter); and International Law (3 credits). Graduation Requirements for JD, HAMLINE UNIV. SCH. OF 
LAW (2013), http://law.hamline.edu/Content.aspx?id=2147503615 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
243. In the process of considering the experiential progression plan, the faculty also voted to amend the 
International Law requirement to require that students complete at least two credits from a menu of courses that 
expose students to law in a global context, some of which are skills or experiential courses. 
244. An internal three-year study showed that Hamline students actually spent their discretionary credits a 
number of different ways and their bar passage did not clearly correlate with their choices. About two-thirds of 
the students elected to take in the range of seven to nine elective bar courses and a vast majority took at least 
six. This data was based on Hamline students who took the Minnesota bar prior to Minnesota’s adoption of the 
Uniform Bar Examination, when the total number of course needed to cover subjects tested on the bar was 
eleven instead of thirteen. Memorandum from Kate Kruse and Bobbi McAdoo to the Faculty of Hamline 
University, Experiential Progression Proposal (March 6, 2013) [hereinafter Memo to Faculty] (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
245. The situation was complicated by the fact that Minnesota had just adopted the Uniform Bar 
Examination, which tested a different list of subjects that demanded an additional six credits of courses to 
achieve full bar coverage. The certificate programs are also working to expand the experiential requirements 
within the certificates so that students can meet an expanded skills requirement while completing a certificate. 
246. Hamline ended up passing an Experiential Progression Plan that retained its progressive structure but 
required fewer credits—one lab in the second year and six credits in the upper level—along with a commitment 
to studying how bar instruction might be abridged or courses combined to lessen the total number of credits 
needed to cover all the subjects tested on the bar. 
247. For example, Hamline’s internal study showed that students elected an average of 9.77 credits in 
skills courses at a time when Hamline required only two skills credits. However, the number of skills credits 
that students elected were distributed along a range from one to twenty-eight credits: about 12% of the students 
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ways. Structuring the curriculum to require all students to progress through a 
series of experiential courses requires a broad, coordinated, and holistic approach 
that re-shapes the curriculum to make room for students to meet experiential 
requirements along with their other learning goals. 
The next Section looks at a menu of relatively low-cost options that might be 
part of such a curricular re-structuring. They are low-cost for faculty because, 
while they require faculty to expend time and effort, learn new ways of teaching, 
and collaborate with members of the practicing bar, they generally stay within 
the skill sets that faculty members see as their strong suits: teaching, research, 
and analysis.248 They are low-cost for students because they look, in part, at ways 
of making core bar and other upper-level instruction more efficient so that it does 
not have to be pitted against skills instruction. And, for law schools that already 
have enough skills and real-practice experiential offerings in their curriculum to 
fully serve the reduced class sizes of the next several years, they will be low in 
monetary costs as well.249 
B. A Menu of Low-Cost Innovations to Implement the Goal of a Well-Balanced 
Curriculum 
Before turning to a specific menu of ideas, it is important to be reminded that 
the end-game of a well-balanced curriculum aims at: (1) integrating substantive 
law instruction into a broader range of skills instruction so that skills coverage 
becomes a structuring criterion as important as doctrinal coverage; (2) creating a 
progression of experiential learning that teaches the conceptual frameworks 
underlying skills instruction in structured settings first and requires students to 
perform lawyering tasks in increasingly unstructured settings; and (3) is 
characterized by collaboration between the legal academy and the practicing bar 
that avoids “farming out” experiential learning to members of the practicing 
bar.250 
This menu of ideas is not meant to constitute a comprehensive program of 
legal education, nor to substitute for the process of developing one. And, it does 
not attempt to state benchmarks for the number of credits that schools should 
allocate to skills instruction in a well-balanced curriculum, another important 
 
met the minimum requirement by taking one 2- or 3-credit class; about 15% took fifteen or more total credits; 
and the rest fell somewhere in between with no discernable pattern of distribution. Bar passage did not correlate 
with the number of skills credits that students elected. Memo to Faculty, supra note 244.  
248. See Rakoff & Minow, supra note 36, at 605 (saying of the first-year problem-solving course at 
Harvard that “distinctly legal capacities are engaged in the analysis of complex, rich factual descriptions of 
problems and in the generation of alternative avenues for problem-solving”). 
249. As noted previously, this will depend on law schools’ budget-cutting priorities and the extent to 
which they have protected the job security of their clinic and other experiential teaching faculty. See supra note 
236 and accompanying text. 
250. See supra Part II.  
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project being carried out by others.251 The proposals that follow should be seen as 
a menu of tactics schools might use as part of a larger strategy to achieve a well-
balanced and well-integrated law school curriculum. 
1. Incorporate Introductory Instruction to Lawyering Skills and 
Competencies into the First Year of Law School 
Many schools have already developed first-year courses or lawyering 
programs introducing lawyering skills like client problem-solving. Harvard Law 
School made a splash with the introduction of its first-year curriculum that uses 
case studies and accompanying readings to focus on developing problem-solving 
skills.252 New York University has an extensive and long-standing Lawyering 
Program that uses simulations and exercises to integrate basic lawyering skills 
instruction with legal research and writing.253 Many other schools have now 
developed similar instruction dedicated to lawyering skills, sometimes in 
conjunction with an expanded legal research and writing program.254 
Schools might also choose to incorporate introductory skills instruction into 
the first year through a coordinated effort among first-year instructors to work 
skills exercises into their classes. Because the first-year curriculum is structured 
and uniform, it is possible for a school to identify in advance the four or five 
skills it wants to introduce in the first year and to integrate a coordinated set of 
exercises based on these skills into each first-year substantive law course. Either 
method—stand-alone course or coordinated integration—would achieve the 
benefit of helping first-year law students put their developing skills of legal 
analysis and reasoning into the larger lawyering process. 
2. Append Skills Labs to Core Bar Courses as Intermediate Skills Training 
One of the best-received components of Hamline’s Experiential Progression 
Plan was the recommendation that one-credit lab modules be appended to core 
bar courses and that students be required to take at least one of these labs in their 
second year of law school.255 The “lawyering skills lab” idea is based on the lab 
 
251. Others have made the case for what a comprehensive reform should be. For example, in a recent 
article, Karen Tokarz, Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Peggy Maisel, and Robert F. Seibel recommend that every law 
graduate should “complete a minimum of 21 credits in experiential courses over the three years of law school, 
including at least five credits in law clinic or externship courses.” Tokarz, et al, supra note 189, at 2. 
252. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 36 (describing the conceptualization of what has become Harvard Law 
School’s first-year problem-solving workshop). 
253. THE LAWYERING PROGRAM, http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/lawyeringprogram/index.htm (last 
visited June 11, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
254. See e.g. Nancy M. Maurer & Linda Fitts Mischler, Introduction to Lawyering: Teaching Students to 
Think Like Professionals, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 96 (1994) (describing Albany’s program of integration with legal 
writing); McAdoo et al, supra note 241 (describing Hamline’s program based on a problem-solving model). 
255. See Memo to Faculty, supra note 244. 
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structure of undergraduate science courses, where substantive material is taught 
in large sections of classes and applied in smaller lab sections.256 Labs permit 
students to get multiple experiences performing and receiving feedback on a 
series of lawyering tasks in a way that is more directly integrated with the 
concurrent substantive law instruction.257 Labs can be offered relatively 
inexpensively by using adjuncts to teach a one-credit lab module accompanying a 
substantive law course. For that reason, labs costs are relatively inexpensive in 
terms of asking faculty to teach outside their comfort zones.258 And, because they 
are offered for low credit and concurrently with core bar instruction, labs are also 
a low-cost option for students trying to balance competing demands on the 
expenditure of their discretionary credits. 
Some of the attractions of labs, however, also raise caution. The division of 
responsibility between faculty-taught courses and adjunct-taught labs can slip 
into a “farm out” model that reinforces the divide between theory and practice, 
rather than integrating the students’ learning in the classroom and in the lab.259 
Delegating the development of a lab entirely to adjuncts without collaboration is 
likely to result in a set of exercises teaching what lawyers practicing in the field 
think students ought to know how to do—what Victor Fleischer called a 
“cookbook” model of training in contrast to teaching the conceptual theories 
underlying practice.260 A “farmed out” lab also runs the risk of undercutting the 
authority of the classroom teacher with the message that in the lab you are going 
to learn the way things “really work.” 
The keys to success in the lab model are collaboration, communication, and 
coordination.261 The professors who teach the courses need to be involved in 
selecting exercises that will supplement and apply the substantive law instruction 
in the underlying course and that fit best into an overall plan to create synergies 
between the classroom and lab instruction.262 One way is to choose doctrinal 
issues that students have difficulty grasping and might better understand through 
application.263 If the labs are being developed as part of a systematic program, 
 
256. Illig, supra note 88, at 234 (describing the University of Oregon’s Mergers & Acquisitions lab). 
257. See id. at 234–35.  
258. Id. at 236 (describing how Oregon asked law firms to “sponsor” labs instead of hiring individual 
adjuncts). 
259. Id. (“Our tenure track faculty are free to focus on their strengths—doctrine and policy—while 
leaving the teaching of dealmaking to those with the best inside knowledge of the current norms and procedures 
of practice.”). 
260. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479. 
261. Illig, supra note 88, at 234. 
262. Id. 
263. For example, in developing a lab for an Evidence course I taught at the University of Nevada Las 
Vegas, we focused one lab on the topic of “opening the door” to adverse character evidence in criminal cases, 
which is much easier to grasp if you see how it plays out in application. The lab was also designed to teach 
witness examination skills, but it did so in the context of helping students grasp a difficult doctrinal concept. 
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such as Hamline’s lab requirement, they also need to fit into the comprehensive 
plan for developing skills throughout the curriculum.264 
3. Offer Short Courses and Online Modules on Basic Bar Subjects 
One of the most unfortunate ways that the traditional law school curriculum 
creates barriers to students’ robust development of a broader range of 
professional skills is by teaching upper-level bar courses exclusively or primarily 
in large sections through the case dialogue method.265 As a result of this curricular 
choice, students who want courses that cover the material tested on the bar 
examination end up taking a high number of high-enrollment courses with a 
repetitive instructional methodology, rather than branching out into smaller 
classes providing more robust opportunities for performance and feedback and 
development of a broader range of skills. 
It is possible to address this concern by substantially integrating other skills 
instruction into the organizing fabric of an upper-level bar course in the same 
way that instruction in legal analysis and reasoning is built into the fabric of the 
case dialogue method.266 In the world of low-cost options, it is also possible to 
sever the coverage of core bar doctrine from the traditional classroom teaching 
entirely and deliver some of that instruction in the format of smaller, lower-credit 
modules. Many schools have opportunities for offering short courses in the 
summer or in the interim between semesters that could be used for this purpose.267 
Advancements in technology also make it possible to create collections of 
relatively short, focused pre-recorded “Ted Talks” on core bar subjects.268 
The availability of bar instruction in short modules gives students a lower-
cost option to gain a foundation in some of the subject matters tested on the bar 
and to choose the more intensive and in-depth coverage of bar subjects in areas in 
 
264. Hamline, for example, has an overall plan to develop skills sets in three areas—advocacy, client 
problem-solving, and transactional planning—that begins in the first year with its problem-solving course and 
ends with required credits of more advanced skills instruction. The University has designed the labs to be an 
intermediate level of skills development. The first phase will develop lab modules that further develop 
advocacy, client problem-solving and transactional skills in Evidence, Family Law, Wills and Trusts, Secured 
Transactions, Criminal Procedure, and Torts II. 
265. See generally Lewyellen, supra note 45 (discussing the traditional education methods of law 
schools).  
266. For an exemplary effort, see generally Carolyn Grose, Outcomes-Based Education One Course at a 
Time: My Experiment with Wills and Trusts, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336 (2012) (describing the systematic and 
holistic restructuring of a large-enrollment bar course to integrate client interviewing, client counseling, and 
storytelling skills and to integrate and balance that teaching with basic doctrinal coverage). 
267. See SANTACROCE, supra note 220, at 28. 
268. Classroom instructors could also use pre-recorded modules to free up time for more interactive 
skills-based learning in class. See Michelle Pistone, Flipped Learning for Legal Education, BEST PRACTICES 
FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (Apr. 25, 2013), http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/2013/04/25/flipped-
learning-for-legal-education/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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which they expect to practice.269 As students exercise this option, the enrollment 
in some core bar courses will diminish, paving the way for integrating more 
interactive and skills-based instruction into those courses.270 
4. Ditch the Casebook in Upper-Level Electives 
One of the professional skills most overlooked in legal education is the skill 
of legal research. The ABA requires all law schools to provide instruction in 
legal research, and basic legal research skills are a core component of most first-
year required legal research and writing courses.271 However, upper-level 
doctrinal instruction continues to rely on casebooks collecting and delivering the 
relevant substantive law to students within the covers of a single edited volume. 
By ditching the casebook in upper-level courses and requiring students to 
research and discover the relevant law as they learn it, law schools could do a 
better job of moving students progressively toward entry-level competence in 
legal research throughout the curriculum.272 
Advancements in technology make it possible to replace the printed 
casebook with instructional materials that provide a platform for the basic 
doctrine in a substantive area and structured portals through which students can 
research relevant law. Teaching from materials that were structured research 
portals rather than edited volumes would open up new possibilities of teaching 
law as it is integrated in statutes, administrative regulations, and other materials. 
Students could use such materials to do targeted research assignments outside of 
class that begin with significant scaffolding that walks students through the 
process of finding a particular kind of relevant authority, such as an 
administrative regulation implementing a statute or an IRS opinion letter. As the 
course progresses, the assignments could become progressively less structured so 
that students would need to integrate the research strategies learned in earlier 
class assignments to complete the later assignments.273 In the classroom, 
professors could draw on many of the same pedagogical techniques they use in 
the case dialogue method: modeling research techniques on computer screens in 
front of the class, calling on students to inquire what answer a student found and 
how he or she found it, and engaging other students to see if they found a 
different answer, or found the same answer through a different route.274 
From the students’ perspective, ditching the casebook would reduce costs 
because casebooks are an expensive way to access material, most of which is in 
 
269. Stuckey, supra note 178, at 822–23. 
270. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479. 
271. See ABA STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION, supra note 176.  
272. Stuckey, supra note 178, at 822–23. 
273. See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 379–82 (discussing a constructivist theory as applied to law 
schools). 
274. BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 165. 
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the public domain and available to them online. But ditching the traditional 
casebook entirely is not cost-free to faculty because there currently does not exist 
a wealth of alternative materials from which professors can draw. Developing 
such teaching materials would require a substantial investment of time and 
imagination.275 But the project of developing such materials is within the 
strengths and competencies of most faculty members because legal research is 
something in which law professors regularly engage. In developing casebooks, 
law professors already research a field broadly and find the cases they want to 
include in published casebook materials. It would not be a stretch for members of 
the legal academy to develop materials designed to build students’ research 
capacities. 
Moreover, there are lower-cost ways of taking incremental steps toward the 
goal, such as developing a set of progressive research assignments and exercises 
in courses that rely on the casebook as the primary course material. By 
developing exercises and assignments in subject areas that rely primarily on state 
and local law, professors could demonstrate how substantive law develops in 
context, rather than through a disjointed collection of materials from diverse 
jurisdictions. 
5. Incorporate Substantial Simulation-Based Teaching into Specialized 
Upper-Level Electives 
One innovation many schools have already developed is specialized upper-
level electives incorporating substantial and extensive simulations in advanced or 
specialized areas. For example, the experiential third year at Washington & Lee 
incorporates a large number of what it calls “practicums,” along with real-
practice experiential courses, such as clinics and externships.276 In practicums, the 
focus is on applying the substantive law in a specialized area by engaging in 
practice-based exercises.277 
 
275 See generally Grose, supra note 266 (describing her process in creating an outcomes-based course). 
276. Washington & Lee School of Law, Third Year Component Descriptions, http://law.wlu.edu/third 
year/page.asp?pageid=652 (last visited June 14, 2013) (on file with McGeorge Law Review). 
277. For example, Washington & Lee describes its Entertainment Law Practicum by saying: 
This course focuses on the practical elements of drafting and negotiating deals in the 
entertainment industry. The course will introduce students to understanding deal structures and 
terms, identifying issues and finding creating solutions to problems, negotiating on your 
client’s behalf (with an emphasis on what’s important to your client, what isn’t, and why), and 
drafting the necessary documents. In order to best simulate a real-world work environment, 
students will be involved in two deals simultaneously, one in which they represent the “talent” 
and one in which they represent the “corporate entity.” There will be a live, hands-on 
negotiation element to the course, as well as a written element intended to mirror how deals are 
done through drafting and revision of documents by e-mail. The instructor will also endeavor 
to have guest “clients” come to class to provide students with a realistic experience in 
addressing client needs and concerns, and giving the best advice (including advice that a client 
may not want to hear). 
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Such courses provide an opportunity to better incorporate the unique 
perspectives of adjunct professors into the curriculum.278 Many schools already 
employ adjunct professors to teach upper-level courses in specialized areas of 
law where, as Robert Illig put it, “ongoing practice experience is highly valued 
and appropriately skilled full-time faculty scarce.”279 Such courses are also 
sometimes offered in areas of advanced or highly specialized areas of law that 
are not tested on bar examinations, such as Sports Law or Entertainment Law.280 
Rather than asking adjunct professors to teach such specialized areas from 
casebooks, law schools could take full advantage of adjunct professors’ in-depth 
knowledge of practice by redeploying them to methods of teaching that are more 
practice-based.281 
6. Look for Ways to Increase the Capacity of Clinic and Externship 
Programs 
No matter how creatively a law school reallocates its resources from 
traditional classroom instruction into simulations, nothing substitutes for the 
value of the real-practice experience students gain in law school clinics and 
externships.282 Surveys of recent law graduates confirm this observation.283 Real 
practice experiences provide opportunities to integrate theory, doctrine, practice, 
procedure, skills, and ethics into unstructured settings that cannot be duplicated 
in simulated materials.284 Although there is much to be gained by supplementing 
or replacing some of the classroom focus on legal analysis and reasoning with 
simulated lawyering exercises, it would be a mistake to deploy existing resources 
away from real-practice experiences for this purpose. As long as a law school 
does not cut back its real-practice opportunities, the recent trend of declining 
student enrollments will necessarily increase the real-practice opportunities for 
the students who remain.285 
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278. Illig, supra note 88, at 236. 
279. Id. 
280. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479. 
281. Illig, supra note 88, at 223. 
282. Joy, supra note 209, at 326; Tokarz, et al., supra note 189. 
283. In a survey of new nonprofit and government lawyers, over 83% rated legal clinics as “very useful” 
in preparing them for the practice of law, with externships/field placements rated as “very useful” by 72% and 
skills courses by only 48%. NALP, 2011 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES AND 
BENEFITS: RESPONSES FROM GOVERNMENT AND NONPROFIT LAWYERS 26 (2012). A survey of new associates 
in private law firms reached similar results, with almost two-thirds (63%) rating legal clinics as “very useful,” 
followed closely by externships/field placements (60%) and skills courses lagging far behind (38.5%). NALP, 
2010 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS 26 (2011). 
284. BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 166–67.  
285. See id. at 110.   
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However, schools should also look at options for increasing the number of 
slots available in clinic and externship programs without reducing the aspects of 
these programs that make them especially pedagogically valuable. In clinics, the 
limited student capacity is created by the intensive demands of individualized 
student supervision as well as the demands of casework.286 Unlike a classroom 
course, which can absorb additional students without substantially increasing the 
workload of the professor, the individualized instruction of clinical pedagogy 
requires a greater investment of instructional time for each student that is added 
to a clinic course.287 Moreover, increasing the number of students in a clinic also 
increases the number of clients or cases that the clinic professor must supervise, 
and these cases might continue after a semester ends, making further demands on 
clinic faculty time. 
By employing a co-teaching model, clinic courses can expand their capacity 
for individualized supervision through collaboration with adjunct professors or 
non-clinic faculty who feel comfortable taking a rotation in an existing clinic.288 
Clinics can also expand their relative capacity by using “hybrid” models 
combining closely-supervised work on small, individual cases with immersion in 
real-practice settings outside the walls of the law school.289 Such hybrid 
collaborations reduce the workload of individual clinic professors by reducing 
the number of cases that the in-house component of the clinic must absorb.290 
They have the additional benefit of combining the unique strengths of clinics and 
externships, providing students both the intensive and individualized supervision 
available in clinics and the verisimilitude of externship placements in law office 
settings.291 
A school may also divert some of its surplus faculty resources into real-
practice experiential education by recruiting non-clinical professors to teach 
small sections of students in its externship program.292 Unlike clinic teaching, 
which requires direct supervision of students in the practice of law, externship 
professors play a supportive pedagogical role.293 Effective externship teaching 
requires professors to understand the theory behind reflective practice and to use 
it to support the learning experiences students are having in their field 
placements.294 In one-on-one consultations, externship professors help students 
identify and figure out how to address problems or frustrations they are 
experiencing in their placements. These are basic teaching skills that most law 
 
286. See supra Part II.D; Joy, supra note 209, at 309.  
287. Joy, supra note 209, at 309.  
288. Barry, et al., supra note 143, at 28. 
289. Id. 
290. Joy, supra note 209, at 309.  
291. See supra notes 180–203 and accompanying text. 
292. Joy, supra note 209, at 321. 
293. Id. at 321–22.  
294. Id. 
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school professors either already possess or can develop within the context of a 
thoughtfully organized and well-supported externship program.295 
Externship teaching also has the benefit of putting faculty in regular contact 
with members of the practicing bar who serve as field supervisors for the student 
placements.296 Fostering such connections can help academic professors stay in 
touch with developments in the practice of law and can also help build good 
relationships between a law school and its alumni who serve as field supervisors 
for externship placements.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The short menu of suggestions offered here is only a start, but it is hopefully 
the start to a larger dialogue of reform in legal education. Reform has long been 
hampered by the myth that theory can be separated from practice and in 
misconceptions about the nature of both doctrinal teaching and professional skills 
training. It is time for legal education to break free of the limitations in this kind 
of thinking. The first step is recognizing the substantial professional skills 
component in the traditional appellate case method of instruction and the 
substantial theoretical component in professional skills education. Once law 
schools recognize the basic continuities in pedagogical structure with other forms 
of experiential education, they can unlock a new world of possibilities for 
developing and re-deploying existing resources of faculty time and money to 
better educating law students for the practice of law. 
 
 
295. See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 383–409. 
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